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MARKET-BASED REGULATORY APPROACHES: A 
COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
AND LAND USE TECHNIQUES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Jerold S. Kayden* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the newest developments in United States national and 
state environmental policy is the movement from command-and-
control to market-based regulatory strategies. 1 Under the traditional 
command-and-control model, government mandates that each indus-
trial polluter achieve a certain level of pollution control, which usu-
ally is based on a specific pollution control technology.2 In contrast, 
market-based approaches, such as pollution charges and trading of 
pollution permits/credits, attempt to harness market forces to 
achieve equal or greater amounts of pollution control in a more cost-
efficient manner. 3 
Under a pollution charge scheme, government charges polluting 
companies a tax or fee for amounts of pollution produced.4 In theory, 
"low-cost" pollution producers-those that can reduce their produc-
tion of pollution at a lower cost relative to the amount of tax or fee-
will decrease their pollution until the marginal cost of reduction 
• Senior Fellow, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. J.D., Harvard University, 1979; 
M.C.R.P., Harvard University, 1979. 
1 See, e.g., PROJECT 88-ROUND II, INCENTIVES FOR ACTION: DESIGNING MARKET-BASED 
ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES 1-4 (Robert N. Stavins ed., 1991) [hereinafter PROJECT 88]; 
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: 21ST ANNUAL REPORT 
4-6 (1991); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regula-
tion: A New Era From an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991). 
2 See PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 5. 
3 See id. at 8-9. 
4 See id. at 6. 
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equals the amount of the tax or fee. "High-cost" pollution produc-
ers-those that face a higher cost of pollution reduction relative to 
the tax or fee-will continue to pollute and pay the relatively lower 
tax or fee as long as the tax or fee is not so high that it makes the 
polluting activity unprofitable. Properly designed, a pollution charge 
program should result in lower aggregate costs for achieving a spe-
cific level of pollution than a command-and-control mandate would, 
and at the same time should encourage companies to develop new, 
lower-cost pollution reduction technologies. 5 
Under a pollution permit/credit trading program, government es-
tablishes a total amount of allowable pollution, which it then "com-
modifies" into permits/credits and distributes by auction or other 
dispensing mechanism to polluting companies.6 If a company is able 
to keep its level of pollution below the amount authorized by its 
permit/credit allocation, then it can sell its unused permits/credits 
to other companies. For high-cost polluters, the cost of purchasing 
a permit/credit may be less than the company's cost of reducing a 
similar amount of pollution, and it thus will elect to enter the permit/ 
credit marketplace. Like pollution charges, the driving idea behind 
trading programs is use of the market to reduce costs for achieving 
the same pollution reduction through command-and-control meth-
ods. 7 
As the sun rises on market-based approaches to environmental 
regulation, the comparative experience of market engagement ef-
forts in local land use regulation is worth considering. Indeed, over 
the past thirty years, local land use regulatory policy increasingly 
has adopted market-driven incentive and trading mechanisms to 
supplement and sometimes even supplant command-and-control ap-
proaches. This article examines this evolution, with particular focus 
on incentive zoning and transfer of development rights (TDR) tech-
niques. Although these techniques differ in substantial ways from 
pollution charge and permit/credit trading programs, they nonethe-
less offer interesting comparative insights for the use of market-
based approaches in environmental protection. 
5 See id. 
6 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 include a tradeable permit system for addressing 
pollutants that cause acid rain problems. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651(0) (Supp. 1990). 
7 See PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 6-7. The United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), which has operated the Emissions Trading Program for several years, claims 
that over $4 billion in savings have been achieved over conventional command-and-control 
approaches. See id. at 7 n.28; see also Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: 
Why Is This Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 233-34 (1988). 
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II. TRADITIONAL LAND USE REGULATORY POLICY 
For most of this century, the prevailing approach to local land use 
regulatory policy in the United States has been one of command-
and-control. Zoning, the principal regulatory tool, generally tells 
landowners what they can and cannot do with their property through 
the prescriptive trio of use, height, and bulk restrictions. 8 Use con-
trols typically restrict development of property within a certain 
district to residential, commercial, or industrial uses. 9 Height con-
trols, for example, may set a maximum height of two-and-one-half 
times the street width, with setbacks occurring above that height 
according to a predetermined formula. 10 Similarly, bulk controls may 
establish a maximum density of eight units per acre or set a floor 
area ratio (the ratio of building area to lot area) of fifteenY By 
referring to these rules, set forth in advance in the zoning text and 
made geographically specific by the zoning map, a landowner knows 
more or less what it can and cannot develop as a matter of right on 
its property. 
Over time, the limitations of command-and-control zoning became 
apparent. Although it achieved simple successes, such as separating 
incompatible land uses, it failed on its larger, perhaps unrealizable, 
promise of quality physical environments for home and work. 12 Ob-
servers and practitioners alike began to characterize the traditional 
zoning model as static, rigid, and inflexible: words brimming with 
pejorative connotations. 13 The early palliatives were inelegant. The 
variance safety valve, designed to mitigate the crude rigidities of 
the Model T ordinance with flexibility in cases involving unusual site-
specific physical hardships, became instead a variance floodgate 
opened regularly by political pressure and worse. 14 
8 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 380-82 (1926) (upholding 
constitutionality of Euclid's zoning ordinance setting forth use, height, and area districts); 
CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL A. WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, 
MISUSE, AND RE-USE OF URBAN LAND 220-55 (4th ed. 1989). 
9 Euclid's ordinance, for example, established six use districts, starting with single-family 
residential uses and ending with the most obstructive manufacturing uses, including plants 
for sewage disposal. See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 380-81. 
10 See New York, N.Y., Zoning Resolution (1916). 
11 See id. At a floor area ratio of 15, a developer may construct a 15-story building occupying 
the entire lot, a 30-story building occupying half the lot, and so forth. 
12 Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden, Foreword: Zoning at Sixty-A Time for Anniver-
sary Reckonings, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP at ix, 
ix-xi (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989). 
13 See, e.g., HAAR & WOLF, supra note 8, at 255-56. 
14 See, e.g., RICHARD BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES 
6-7 (1966). 
568 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:565 
The first wave of truly revisionist zoning tempered the generally 
applicable prescriptive regulations with the discretionary mecha-
nisms of special permits, conditional uses, planned unit develop-
ments, and cluster zoning. 15 Landowners would present development 
plans to a local government, which would review them on a project-
by-project basis and, in an exercise of discretionary authority, ap-
prove or disapprove them according to special guidelines that over-
rode the underlying command-and-control requirements. 
The second wave of revisionist zoning recognized market forces 
as an additional source of flexibility and introduced such market-
based approaches as incentive zoning and TDR.16 Recognizing the 
power of land use regulations to confer as well as take away property 
rights, landowners now would be encouraged, rather than com-
manded, to provide or preserve desired public amenities in their 
private developments through the powerful force of financial self-
interest. Public and private interests would join forces for the com-
mon good. 
III. MARKET-BASED LAND USE REGULATORY ApPROACHES 
A. Incentive Zoning 
Incentive zoning is a land use regulatory technique through which 
cities grant private real estate developers the legal right to disregard 
otherwise applicable zoning restrictions in return for providing en-
vironmental amenities such as public parks and plazas and, most 
recently, social facilities and services such as affordable housing, day 
care centers, and job training. 17 Command-and-control gives way to 
a bargaining process between local government and private devel-
oper. 
Incentive zoning expressly enlists market forces by offering de-
velopers a choice of regulatory incentives that either increase rev-
enue or reduce costs. The most popular incentive, the floor area 
bonus, grants developers the right to build additional rentable 
space. 18 Other incentives may exempt development from height and 
setback requirements or reduce the required parking ratio and 
15 See id. at 7-11. 
16 See, e.g., T. LASSAR, CARROTS & STICKS: NEW ZONING DOWNTOWN 12--19, 184-88 
(1989). 
17 Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the 
Municipal Art Society and NoHan Cases, 39 J. DRB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 3 (1991). 
18 See id. at 5 & n.7. 
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thereby significantly reduce construction costS. 19 When the value of 
an incentive exceeds the cost of providing an amenity, then devel-
opers may find it in their self-interest to engage in such public-
private transactions. 20 
Cities and suburbs across the United States use incentive zoning. 
New York City introduced the technique in 1961 by allowing devel-
opers to construct ten square feet of extra office space for every 
square foot of plaza, as well as three bonus square feet for every 
square foot of arcade. 21 Through the 1960s and 1970s, the city ex-
panded its list of incentive zoning amenities to include through-block 
arcades, covered pedestrian spaces, theatres, and elevated plazas. 22 
The city's policy garnered impressive developer participation, with 
more than two-thirds of all office buildings and most residential 
apartment towers receiving substantial zoning bonuses.23 Between 
1963 and 1975, the city doled out more than twelve million square 
feet of bonus office space to ninety-one office buildings. 24 
Other cities quickly introduced their own versions of incentive 
zoning, appropriately tailored to their respective environments. 
Thus, San Francisco, California, offered zoning bonuses to encourage 
provision of rooftop observatories. 25 Anchorage, Alaska, furnished 
incentives for climate-controlled courtyards. 26 Cincinnati, Ohio, 
granted incentives for historic preservation.27 Miami, Florida, em-
ployed incentives to encourage retail activity at street level. 28 Most 
recently, cities have expanded their menu of amenities to low-income 
housing, day care centers, and job training. 29 
Given its express reliance on market forces to accomplish public 
objectives, incentive zoning poses special questions that traditional 
command-and-control land use regulations do not present. 
19 See id. 
20 See J. GETZELS & M. JAFFEE, ZONING BONUSES IN CENTRAL CITIES 21 (Planning 
Advisory Service Report No. 410, 1988). 
21 See JEROLD S. KAYDEN, INCENTIVE ZONING IN NEW YORK CITY: A COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 10 (Policy Analysis Series No. 201, 1978). 
22 See id. at 12-14. 
23 See id. at 10-11. 
24 See id. at 22-23. 
26 See Peter S. Svirsky, San Francisco: The Downtown Development Bonus System, in 
THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 
139, 145 (Norman Marcus & Marilyn W. Groves eds., 1970). 
26 See ROBERT S. COOK, JR., ZONING FOR DOWNTOWN URBAN DESIGN 109 (1980). 
'l:1 See GETZELS & JAFFEE, supra note 20, at 8. 
28 See id. at 6. 
29 See Kayden, supra note 17, at 5-6. 
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1. The Necessity Issue 
Is the incentive necessary to obtain the amenity? Many ameni-
ties-such as parks, plazas, and covered pedestrian spaces-make a 
development project more attractive to tenants and thus may pay 
for themselves through higher rents. Several studies have demon-
strated, for example, that parkland and public squares adjacent to 
buildings increase the capitalized value of such buildings. 30 If the 
private market would provide the desired public amenity without 
behavior-altering government intervention-because the amenity in-
creases the attractiveness of the project and pays for itself-then it 
is not only unnecessary but harmful to offer incentives that them-
selves may exact a social cost, such as the loss of light and air, or 
more congestion. 31 
The major hurdle for policymakers is to develop reliable metho-
dologies for measuring when incentives are necessary. Several gov-
ernment subsidy programs, like the United States's Urban Devel-
opment Action Grant program, have relied upon so-called "but for" 
tests-"but for" the incentive or subsidy, the public benefit would 
not have been provided. 32 These programs have achieved a mottled 
record of success in ferreting out unnecessary public assistance. 33 
2. The Pricing Issue 
How much of an incentive should a city provide to developers in 
return for a desired public amenity? In this context, the "price," for 
example, of bonus floor area is the amenity that the city demands in 
return. The "price" is too low when the city could have obtained 
more amenity for the same incentive or dispensed less incentive for 
the same amenity. From the public's point of view, government 
ideally would provide only that amount of incentive precisely nec-
essary to get the job done and not one square foot more, because 
30 See T. Fox, URBAN OPEN SPACE: AN INVESTMENT THAT PAYS 34--35 (1990). As the 
consumer's appetite for environmentally safe products intensifies, it may be in the financial 
interests of the producer substantially to reduce or eliminate pollution byproducts. 
31 A public interest organization succeeded in halting construction of a massive office-
residential project at New York City's Columbus Circle, in part because the project would 
have cast a shadow over the city's Central Park. See Taylor, The Shadow: The Uproar Over 
the Big Coliseum Project, NEW YORK, Oct. 5, 1987, at 40. 
32 See generally Eric Stevenson, A Developer's Guide to Urban Development Action Grants, 
10 REAL EST. REV. 80, 82 (Winter 1981). 
33 See Gruen, PubliC/Private Projects-A Better Way for Downtowns, 45 URB. LAND 5 
(Aug. 1986). 
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the incentive itself carries a social cost. 34 Furthermore, it is not a 
function of government to grant financial windfalls to private recip-
ients when the public interest does not justify it. 
The problem for the policymaker is in setting the correct price. 
In theory, if the net capitalized value of a floor area bonus marginally 
exceeds the full cost of the amenity, then the developer should be 
willing to engage in the transaction. 35 In practice, the market only 
reveals when the incentive is too low. In that case, no developer will 
respond to the city's regulatory enticements. On the other hand, 
widespread use of incentives only assures the policymaker that the 
incentive is sufficient, without providing the additionally desirable 
assurance that it is not overly generous. 
Unfortunately, the experience in many United States cities shows 
a consistent pattern of underpricing incentives by granting more of 
them than is necessary to encourage the desired private behavior. 36 
The reasons for this practice include a paucity of on-staff real estate 
financial expertise, the utilization of inadequate or incorrect analyt-
ical frameworks for evaluating deals,37 and the absence of any mar-
ket-driven imperative for government to negotiate the best deal. 
3. The Baseline Property Rights Issue 
Incentive zoning operates above a regulatory foundation, allowing 
developers to ignore baseline bulk, height, and other command-and-
control restrictions. Some observers believe that incentive zoning 
encourages governments cynically to manipulate the baseline, tight-
ening regulation beyond what otherwise would be appropriate, then 
loosening it in return for the provision of amenities.38 For example, 
objective physical planning criteria for a given area might suggest a 
floor area ratio of fifteen for office buildings.39 City planners also 
may want small public parks in the area. Instead of giving floor area 
34 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
35 This is not an easy calculation and inherently relies upon many assumptions. See GETZELS 
& JAFFE, supra note 20, at 21 (discussing "cost plus" methodology). 
36 See OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER, NEW YORK CITY PLANNING 
COMMISSION: GRANTING SPECIAL PERMITS FOR BONUS FLOOR AREA Report A-23-88, at MS-
3 (Sept. 15, 1988); Steinbrueck, Public Costs and Private Benefits, CITYWATCH, Mar. 1989, 
at 304; KAYDEN, supra note 21, at 59-65 (discussing New York City experience). 
37 See OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER, supra note 36, at MS-6-7. 
38 See Daniel R. Mandelker, The Basic Philosophy of Zoning: Incentive or Restraint?, in 
THE NEW ZONING, supra note 25, at 14, 18-2l. 
39 Such physical planning criteria includes the capacity of public infrastructure, such as 
sewers, streets, sidewalks, and mass transit, and the character of existing buildings in the 
area. See Kayden, supra note 17, at 26-27. 
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bonuses on top of a fifteen-floor area ratio baseline, the planners 
decide to establish the baseline ratio at twelve, then offer bonuses 
allowing developers to obtain a fifteen. Thus, government will be 
able to have its cake, getting an environment produced by a fifteen 
as opposed to a fifteen-plus-bonus floor area ratio, and eat it too, 
with the creation of the parks.40 Indeed, the United States Supreme 
Court has posited this overleveraged scenario to justify invalidation 
of a land use regulatory action. 41 
Because evidence supporting the claim that cities consistently 
manipulate baseline zoning never has been assembled, one is left to 
speculate as to the frequency of its occurrence. To the extent that 
incentive zoning bonuses have arisen as afterthoughts to existing 
zoning density limitations on the books for many years-not an 
uncommon scenario for incentive zoning programs-the overlever-
aged scenario appears unlikely. To the extent that bonuses arise in 
the context of a complete overhaul of a city's zoning ordinance, the 
charge acquires greater, although hardly overpowering, resonance. 
4. The Equity Issue 
By violating baseline zoning, albeit for an arguably noble cause, 
incentive zoning creates social costs, as well as benefits, that may 
be unfairly distributed. Assume a city council has determined that 
the city is better off having more amenities, even with the social 
costs associated with floor area incentives such as less light and air 
and more congestion.42 Even if this judgment is a good one, there 
still may be distributional consequences on a neighborhood-by-neigh-
borhood basis. For example, the tenants of a building adjacent to an 
incentive building substantially larger than otherwise permitted will 
not be happy with the enlarged shadow cast over their residences 
or with the greater street and sidewalk congestion. 
This critique is most powerful when, as is increasingly the case, 
the amenity is geographically or conceptually unrelated to the de-
velopment project enjoying the incentive.43 While the city as a whole 
may benefit from a developer's contribution of a new library miles 
away in return for increased density, the neighborhood immediately 
surrounding the bonused project on balance suffers disproportion-
40 See id. at 46. 
41 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 n.5 (1987). 
42 This has been referred to as incentive zoning's "Tale of Two Cities." See Kayden, supra 
note 17, at 28-29. 
43 See id. at 25-26. 
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ately.44 One class of city residents bears greater burdens than any 
other class for the benefit of all, creating a large class of winners 
and a small class of losers.45 
Existing incentive zoning programs do not systematically address 
these concerns. While the commonplace procedural protections of 
public hearings and information disclosure help assure that voices 
are heard and no one is caught off-guard,46 they do not guarantee 
the fair distribution of benefits and burdens. New efforts to attain a 
"fair share" geographic allocation of desirable and undesirable land 
uses within cities47 may offer useful models for market-based pro-
grams that allow specific users to violate otherwise applicable land 
use or environmental standards. 48 
5. The DelegitimationiMoral Corruption Issue 
Is a system that allows individuals to "buy" their way out of 
compliance with otherwise applicable law49 justifiable on a broader 
basis? Why should some individuals observe the law when others 
can pay to elude it? If the rule of law isn't the rule of law, can 
anarchy be far behind? Although one may argue facilely that this is 
a case of one law (incentive zoning) trumping another (baseline zon-
ing), that argument begs the question. Because zoning rules theo-
retically are derived from objective physical planning criteria-the 
capacity of streets, sidewalks, sewers, and water pipes to accom-
modate development and its attendant population, the amount of 
light and air at street level, the compatibility of new structures with 
44 See, e.g., Municipal Art Soc'y v. City of New York, 522 N.Y.S.2d 800,803-04 (Sup. Ct. 
1987). 
45 Indeed, much of the Supreme Court's Just Compensation Clause jurisprudence turns on 
the concept that individuals should not be forced to bear burdens that, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by society as a whole. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 
49 (1960). 
46 See, e.g., New York, N.Y., New York City Charter, Uniform Land Use Review Proce-
dure § 197-c (1989). 
47 See id. § 203. The New York law states in part: 
Id. 
The criteria shall be designed to further the fair distribution among communities of 
the burdens and benefits associated with city facilities, consistent with community 
needs for services and efficient and cost effective delivery of services and with due 
regard for the social and economic impacts of such facilities upon the areas surround-
ing the sites. 
4B Pollution charge or permit/credit trading programs that allow a company to "buyout" of 
pollution compliance while continuing to pollute can create similar problems if the pollution 
has a local as well as citywide or regional impact. See PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 9. 
49 This has been referred to as a "license to pollute." Id. at 2. 
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the existing neighborhood, and so forth50-any overriding of that 
zoning intrinsically undermines the legitimacy of the entire regula-
tory system. 
Once landowners understand that the command-and-control base 
limitations are not sacrosanct, they will be less inclined to accede to 
the limitations' necessity. 51 Dazzled by the array of potential amen-
ities, regulators will fall prey to the corruption of the transaction 
and give the "green light" otherwise undesirable projects solely to 
obtain the benefits. 52 Judges, whose frequent task it is to review the 
legitimacy of goals that government proffers in support of regulatory 
efforts, now will be more skeptical of such goals. 53 
Available evidence from the field does not demonstrate any whole-
sale discounting of basic zoning. While regulators doubtless have 
approved questionable projects,54 and while some individuals have 
urged that they should be entitled to the higher densities as a matter 
of right,55 any state court docket will reveal that baseline zoning 
continues to restrict and aggravate owners. 56 In the final analysis, 
incentive zoning necessarily relies on the rigidity of baseline com-
mand-and-control zoning in order to generate the financial benefit 
from ignoring that baseline. 57 
B. Transfer of Development Rights 
TDR programs authorize the transfer, usually by sale, of devel-
opment rights from one property to another. 58 Borrowing from the 
50 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
51 See WILLIAM H. WHYTE, CITY 237, 278 (1988). 
52 See PROPERTY ADVISORY GROUP, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, PLANNING GAIN, 
§ 5.04, at 7 (1981) (discussing parallel British incentive zoning system of planning gain). 
53 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, at 837 n.5 (purpose underlying 
restriction "positively militates against the practice" of trading waivers for many types of 
amenities). 
54 See, e.g., Municipal Art Soc'y v. City of New York, 522 N. Y.S.2d 800, 803-04 (Sup. Ct. 
1987) (New York City improperly granted zoning bonus in order to obtain citywide amenities). 
55 See, e.g., Michael Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning 
in THE NEW ZONING, supra note 25, at 55. 
66 See Jerold S. Kayden, Judges As Planners: Limited or General Partners, in ZONING 
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 12, at 223, 246-47 nn. 58-64. 
57 Cf PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 4 n.19 (noting that incentive-based environmental 
policies depend on underlying command-and-control regulatory system). 
58 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1978); Fred 
F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384 (1976); JOHN S. COSTONI8, 
SPACE ADRIFT: SAVING URBAN LANDMARKS THROUGH THE CHICAGO PLAN 32-33 (1974); 
Norman Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 372, 
375 (1971). 
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metaphor of property as a bundle of sticks, such programs classify 
the right to develop as a stick capable of being severed from geo-
graphically specific sites and sold like a fungible commodity. 59 Gov-
ernment agencies have implemented TDR programs most frequently 
to mitigate the financial impact resulting from restrictions on envi-
ronmentally sensitive lands60 or historic landmark buildings. 61 When 
government prohibits owners from developing sensitive land or de-
molishing landmarks, TDR programs theoretically permit owners to 
recoup some, if not all, of the value loss that these restrictions 
cause. 62 In this way, TDR programs help address the "wipe-out" 
problem63 associated with land use regulations that take away much 
private value. 
TDR programs commonly operate under one of two administrative 
models. In the "two-party" model, landowners sell their available 
development rights directly or with the assistance of a broker to 
interested buyers.64 In the "bank" model, an entity, usually a gov-
ernment agency or nonprofit organization, purchases the develop-
ment rights and banks them for later sale to third parties. 65 
Under either model, local governments face several key adminis-
trative and policy decisions before implementation. A city must de-
fine the types of parcels from which development rights may be 
transferred. The city may define such parcels categorically-for ex-
ample, all farmland over a certain number of acres or all parcels 
containing historic structures defined by specific criteria66-or geo-
graphically-all sites within in a given mapped district, sometimes 
known as the "sending district". 67 In addition, cities must determine 
sites that may receive development rights. This determination also 
may be by category, but more often these sites comprise geograph-
ical areas known as "receiving districts". 68 
59 See COSTONIS, supra note 58, at 35. 
60 See PROTECTING THE NEW JERSEY PINELANDS 110 (B. Collins & E. Russell eds., 1988). 
61 See, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 113-14; Marcus, supra note 58, at 375. 
62 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137. 
63 See WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 5 (D. 
Hagman & D. Misczynski eds., 1978). 
64 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 113-14; Marcus, supra note 58, at 375. 
65 See COSTONIS, supra note 58, at 42. 
66 New York City, for example, has defined a landmark as "thirty years old or older ... 
[with] a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of the 
development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or nation .... " Penn Cent., 
438 U.S. at 110-11 n.9. 
67 See COSTONIS, supra note 58, at 50-51. 
68 See id. 
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The required connection between sending and receiving parcels 
varies. Some programs limit transfers to adjacent or neighboring 
parcels.69 Others allow transfers to parcels within specified receiving 
districts. 7o Still others contemplate transfers throughout a jurisdic-
tion. 71 Whether they purchase development rights directly from the 
selling owner of the rights or from a development rights bank, 
eventual users must be able to exceed otherwise applicable com-
mand-and control zoning restrictions by the amount purchased. Oth-
erwise, the buyers would have no use for the excess rights. 
One may understand TDR in some respects as a variant of incen-
tive zoning.72 TDR programs only work when there is a demand for 
extra development rights. 73 They require that government waive 
otherwise applicable zoning for the buyer of development rights. 74 
Although it is claimed that, unlike TDR programs, incentive zoning 
increases the overall citywide density of development,75 this need 
not always be the case. Imagine the situation in which a city wishes 
to preserve a vacant parcel of land for open space, and the land is 
zoned at a floor area ratio of two. The city grants a two floor area 
bonus to a developer of another similarly sized property, who in 
return makes to the city a cash payment that the city uses to pur-
chase the development rights of the vacant parcel. This would then 
constitute use of incentive zoning for land preservation purposes, 
with no increase in overall density. 
Although the idea of TDR has stimulated more scholarly interest 
than incentive zoning,76 actual program implementation and use is 
far rarer. N ew York City has had more experience with its landmark 
preservation TDR ordinance than most cities. 77 Over the years, the 
69 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1978) (discussing 
New York City's program). 
70 See LASSAR, supra note 16, at 186 (discussing Seattle's program). 
71 See id. at 83 (discussing San Francisco's program). 
72 See COSTONIS, supra note 58, at 28-39. 
73 See LASSAR, supra note 16, at 83. 
74 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
75 See COSTONIS, supra note 58, at 33-34. 
76 While only one law review article has dealt exclusively with the general legality of 
incentive zoning, see David J. Benson, Bonus or Incentive Zoning-Legal Implications, 21 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 895 (1970), many have analyzed TDR. See, e.g., John J. Costonis, Devel-
opment Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); Norman Marcus, 
Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhattan's 
Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77 (1975); Hershel J. Richman & Lane H. Kendig, 
Transfer Development Rights-A Pragmatic View, 9 URB. LAW. 571 (1977). 
77 Nonetheless, fewer than 15 cases of transfers from landmark buildings were recorded 
during the program's first 19 years of operation. See LASSAR, supra note 16, at 187. 
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law has permitted the transfer of development rights from lots that 
landmarks occupy to adjacent lots, usually defined as contiguous lots; 
lots across a street or opposite the landmark lot; or, for corner lots, 
lots fronting on the same street intersection. 78 The maximum amount 
of rights transferable is the maximum floor area authorized for the 
parcel less existing built floor area. 79 The maximum floor area in-
crease allowable on the receiving site is twenty percent above the 
baseline floor area ratio. 8O Before permitting transfers, the city plan-
ning commission must find that the transfer will not create undue 
planning problems for the receiving site, and that preservation of 
the landmark will continue.81 An instrument of transfer and deed 
restrictions help record the deal and guarantee that future owners 
of the selling parcel will not build in the now sterilized air rights. 82 
Other TDR programs attempt to preserve open space, agricultural 
properties, and other environmentally sensitive land. Montgomery 
County, Maryland,83 and Burlington County, New Jersey,84 have 
agricultural land TDR programs, while Chesterfield Township, New 
Jersey,85 and the Pinelands in New Jersey,86 have TDR programs 
for open space and wetlands. 
TDR programs raise many of the same market-based regulatory 
policy issues that incentive zoning poses, but present additional 
concerns specifically related to the trading of rights. 
1. The Market Creation Issue 
TDR programs depend upon the creation of a functioning market-
place, with buyers, sellers, and "market-greasing" intermediaries. 
Because it is relatively easy to obtain needed floor area through 
other mechanisms, such as incentive zoning, zoning amendments, 
and variances, TDR programs have experienced problems generat-
ing demand for development rights at acceptable prices to sellers. 87 
Without such demand, TDR programs cannot accomplish their public 
78 See New York, N.Y., Zoning Resolution art. VII, ch. 4, §§ 74-79 to -793 (1971). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 See James E. Peters, Saving Farmland: How Well Have We Done, in PLANNING 13 
(Sept. 1990); Thompson, Zoned/or Agriculture, COUNTRY J., Nov. 1983, at 84,95. 
84 See Peters, supra note 83, at 16-17. 
86 See HAAR & WOLF, supra note 8, at 275. 
86 See PROTECTING THE NEW JERSEY PINELANDS, supra note 60, at 110. 
87 See LASSAR, supra note 16, at 83. 
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purpose objective of preserving environmentally sensitive lands or 
historically significant buildings. Not surprisingly, because transac-
tions are relatively rare, investment bankers and other fee-driven 
market intermediaries have been notable for their absence in extant 
TDR programs. 
2. The Market Integrity Issue 
Markets for development rights depend on stable and predictable 
zoning, a species as endangered as the whooping crane. The demand 
for and price of development rights are direct functions of a city's 
overall regulatory policy. If the city regulates tightly in designated 
receiving districts, it may create demand for development rights in 
such areas. Conversely, if the city regulates leniently, the demand 
for such rights likely will plummet. One may analogize the govern-
ment's role to that of the Federal Reserve Board, whose manipula-
tion of the money supply affects interest rates and the competition 
for funds. When buyers and sellers have little confidence in the 
predictability and stability of actions that city officials take, then 
they will be less willing to forge a functioning marketplace for de-
velopment rights. 
3. The Transaction Cost Issue 
Experience from the few operating TDR programs suggests that 
the transaction costs associated with deals and program administra-
tion may be relatively high.88 Unlike incentive zoning, in which the 
specific terms of the trade usually are set forth in the zoning ordi-
nance,89 TDR transactions involve time-consuming negotiations over 
price, preparation of purchase and sale agreements and other doc-
uments, and closings. Valuation difficulties plague buyers and sellers 
alike. For the seller, the development rights are worth the difference 
between the capitalized value of a new development and the value 
of the existing use. For the buyer, the development rights reflect a 
value based on the buyer's site and project plans. 
Because TDR programs traditionally operate in a discretionary 
manner, with each transaction individually scrutinized by the public 
sector, administrative costs can be steep. Moreover, government 
incurs monitoring costs to keep track of transferred rights and to 
88 See, e.g., Small & Derr, Controlling Development Rights: The Alternatives, 31 J. SOIL 
& WATER CONSERVATION 190, 193 (1976). 
89 See, e.g., New York, N.Y., Zoning Resolution, art. VII, ch. 4, §§ 74-79 to-793 (1971). 
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ensure that future owners do not build on parcels where rights 
already have been sold. Finally, if government is the buyer under 
the "bank" model, further valuation questions arise. 90 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As United States and global91 environmental protection policy-
makers evince greater interest in market-based regulatory ap-
proaches and less interest in command-and-control strategies, it is 
essential not only to acknowledge the unknowns, but also to review 
existing market-based regulatory experiences. The questions for 
environmental market-based solutions track to some degree the is-
sues that market-based land use regulatory policies raise. How does 
one establish property rights in the pollution area ?92 How should 
government allocate and price pollution permits/credits?93 How far 
should the bubble extend for determining overall pollution levels, 
and what about offsets and netting?94 Will competitive markets work, 
with enough buyers and sellers?95 Should a permit/credit bank be 
established?96 Who will monitor and enforce the marketplace?97 How 
high will transaction costs be?98 How can market-based programs 
that tolerate, indeed sell, the right to pollute themselves be "sold" 
to those members of the public who are convinced of the absolute 
evil of pollution and the need to eliminate it at any cost?99 Can 
incentives assure development of better technologies?l()() What about 
equity concerns?lOl 
Obviously, land use regulatory experiences with incentive zoning 
and TDR programs do not provide precise answers to these ques-
tions. In particular, neither of these techniques was designed with 
marginal cost decisionmaking at the crux of their operation. N one-
theless, the empirical wisdom derived from their years of application 
90 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
91 See PROJECT 88, supra note 1, at 3, 6-7. 
92 See id. at 6-7, 91-92. 
93 See id. at 6-7. 
94 See id. at 9. 
95 See id. at 7; Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An 
Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 109-53 (1989). 
96 Hahn & Hester, supra note 95, at 129. 
97 See id. at 143. 
98 See id. at 140. 
99 See generally STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? ECONOMISTS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (1981). 
100 See id. at 9. 
\01 See id. at 17-18, 38, 86-88. 
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offers some comparative insight for existing102 and forthcoming mar-
ket-based efforts in national and international environmental policy. 
102 It is worth noting, of course, that researchers have examined the operation of existing 
market-based environmental approaches for years. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Economics, 
Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1985) 
(describing studies of EPA's emissions trading program). 
